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TAXES-CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-NONDISCRIMINATORY AD VALOREM TAX
NOT PROHIBITED BY IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE
In Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages' the United States Supreme Court held
that the assessment by the tax commissioners and tax assessors of Gwinnett County, Georgia, of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax
against petitioner's inventory of imported tires maintained at its wholesale
distribution warehouse was not within the prohibition of the ImportExport Clause of the Constitution.2
Petitioner, Michelin Tire Corp., imported and distributed in the United
States tires and tubes manufactured in France and Nova Scotia. This
distribution was accomplished from warehouses throughout the country.
In this process 25% of the tires and tubes were imported from Nova Scotia
and were delivered to the United States in over-the-road trailers packed
and sealed at the factory. The other 75% were delivered by sea from France
and Nova Scotia in sea vans packed and sealed at the factories. The tires
were loaded into the vans or trailers in bulk. When unloaded they were
stored on pallets by type. This was the only processing required before sale
and delivery.
The respondent county assessed an ad valorem property tax against the
tires and tubes that were in the warehouse on the assessment date. Michelin brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Gwinnett
County Superior Court in which it was alleged that with the exception of
certain passenger tubes which had been removed from the original shipping cartons the tax was prohibited by the Constitution.3 The court
granted the requested relief. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed as to
the tubes which remained in the corrugated shipping cartons. The court
reversed as to the tires stating that they had lost their status as imports.
The court held the tires were subject to taxation because they were sorted
and stored with other tires held for sale.' Michelin appealed to the United
States Supreme Court as to the assessment of the ad valorem tax against
the imported tires.'
In Low v. Austin6 the Supreme Court held that the imposition of a
nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on imported goods by the
states was prohibited by the Import-Export Clause until the goods lost
1.
2.

__

U.S. __,
U.S. at

-,

96 S.Ct. 535, 46 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976).
96 S.Ct. at 538, 46 L.Ed.2d at 500.

3. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 2.
4. 233 Ga. 712, 214 S.E.2d 349 (1975).
5.

-

U.S. at

-,

n.2, 96 S.Ct. at 538, n.2, 46 L.Ed.2d at 499, n.2. Respondents did

not cross-petition as to the holding of the Georgia Supreme Court regarding the tubes in the
corrugated shipping cartons.
6.

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29, 20 L.Ed. 517 (1871).
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their import status and became part of the mass of property within the
state. In that case the California Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax on the theory that such a
tax did not tax the goods as imports but as property within the state. The
Supreme Court disagreed and held that such a tax was precluded by the
holding of Brown v. Maryland.7
In Brown the Court held unconstitutional an act of the Maryland legislature which required importers to take out a license before they could sell
their goods. The Court admitted that while a rule with universal application might be difficult to formulate, it was possible to state generally when
a tax was prohibited by the Constitution.
It is sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when the importer
has so acted upon the thing imported that it has become incorporated and
mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost
its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the
taxing power of the state; but while remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was
imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the
prohibition in the Constitution.!
In reversing the assessment of the ad valorem tax, the Low Court employed the reasoning of Brown to hold that any such tax was within the
prohibition of the Constitution and without the power of the state.9 The
goods while they remained in the status of imports were not within the
taxing power of the state.'"
In later cases the question of the constitutionality of the imposition of
taxes was decided after inquiring as to whether the goods retained their
status as imports. The Court consistently failed to consider the nature of
the tax, but merely relied upon the test in Brown as to whether the goods
were in their original package or form."
In considering the Michelin case, the Court affirmed the Georgia Supreme Court without considering the question of whether or not that court
was correct in holding that the tires could no longer be given the status of
imports. 2 The Court found it unnecessary to consider that question because it concluded that imposition of a "nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax
[was] not the type of state exaction which the Framers of the Constitution
7. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 6 L.Ed. 678 (1827).
8. Id. at 441-442, 6 L.Ed. at 686.
9. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 34, 20 L.Ed. at 519.
10. Id. at 35, 20 L.Ed. at 519.
11. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 79 S.Ct. 383, 3 L.Ed.2d
490 (1959)(while the assessed tax was an ad valorem tax, the inquiry was limited to the status
of the goods); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 65 S.Ct. 870, 89 L.Ed. 1252 (1945);
and May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496, 20 S.Ct. 976, 44 L.Ed. 1165 (1900).
12. U.S. at
, 96 S.Ct. at 538, 46 L.Ed.2d at 500.
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or the Court in Brown had in mind. . . . ,,, The Court, therefore, overruled
Low. '
In examining the reasons for the inclusion of the Import-Export Clause
in the Constitution, the Court emphasized the defects of the Articles of
Confederation which the framers of the Constitution sought to alleviate,
and how this was to be accomplished.
The Court observed that to avoid the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution gave exclusive power to the Federal Government to levy imposts and duties on imports so that it could speak with one
voice when regulating trade with other countries; 5 so that tax proceeds
from imports could be a source of revenue for the federal government;'" and
so that coastal states could not interfere with the flow of goods to inland
states. 7 The Court rejected the notion that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax would impede these objectives. A tax based on the foreign origin
of the goods might provide such an impediment but a nondiscriminatory
ad valorem tax would have no more than the incidental effect allowed by
other decisions and would not substantially affect the level of imports.'"
The Court further stated that the Import-Export Clause prohibition on
imposts or duties may be read as to allow other types of taxes which do
not tax imports as imports. The Court noted that at the time of the drafting of the Constitution imposts and duties had carried the general inference of being applied to imports while taxes did not.'9 The Court declined,
because of the ambiguity of the Import-Export Clause, to extend its prohibition to taxation which does not bring about the problems that the drafters sought to eliminate. 0
The Court found further support for its conclusion in the Brown decision
itself. In Brown the Court did not give a complete interpretation of the
limits of the Import-Export Clause prohibition because the only question
, 96 S.Ct. at 539, 46 L.Ed.2d at 502.
13. Id. at
, 96 S.Ct. at 538, 46 L.Ed.2d at 500.
14. Id. at
15. See 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 439, 6 L.Ed. at 685; 358 U.S. at 555-556, 79 S.Ct. at 395, 3
L.Ed.2d at 504 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); and Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566, 574, 24
L.Ed. 1015, 1018 (1878).
16. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 439, 6 L.Ed. at 685; 358 U.S. at 556, 79 S.Ct. at 395, 3 L.Ed.2d
at 504 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
17. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 440, 6 L.Ed. at 686; 97 U.S. at 574, 24 L.Ed. at 1018; 358 U.S.
at 545, 79 S.Ct. at 389, 3 L.Ed.2d at 498; Id. at 556-557, 79 S. Ct. at 395, 3 L.Ed.2d at 504505 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
U.S. at -. , 96 S.Ct. at 541-542, 46 L.Ed.2d at 504. Cases cited by the Court
18.
for this proposition were: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 79 S.Ct.
383, 3 L.Ed.2d 490 (1959)(taxation of goods committed to current operational needs by manufacturer); May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496, 20 S.Ct. 976, 44 L.Ed. 1165 (1900)(taxation after
breakup of shipping cases); Waring v. The Mayor, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 110, 19 L.Ed. 342 (1868)
(taxation after initial sale).
, 96 S.Ct. at 543, 46 L.Ed.2d at 506, quoting from 1 W. CROSSKEY,
U.S. at 19.
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 296-97 (1953).
, 96 U.S. at 544, 46 L.Ed.2d at 508.
U.S. at 20.
-
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there presented was the constitutionality of requiring an importer to obtain
a license from the state." The Brown Court did, however, state that "there
must be a point of time when the prohibition ceases, and the power of the
state to tax commences .. ."22 In Michelin the Court pointed out that
Brown recognized two occasions when such a tax would not violate the
Constitution. The Court held that the prohibition would not be applicable
if the tax were assessed after the status of an import was lost. This determination was to be made by the original package doctrine.
As to the second situation, the Court in Michelin termed this "another
situation of particular significance .... ."I' This occasion was when an
import was taxed but not as an import. In Brown the Court examined the
exception made from the prohibition of the Import-Export Clause as to
'those assessments necessary for execution of the inspection laws of the
states. 5 The opinion in Michelin emphasized the Court's treatment of this
exception. Further emphasis was placed on the similar characteristics between the exception necessary for execution of the state's inspection laws
and the prohibited assessments.26 In addition, in Brown certain assessments were declared outside the prohibition of the Constitution because
they did not single out imports but attached to all goods. 27 From this the
Court concluded that Brown did not intend that all impositions of state
taxes be prohibited merely because the goods retained the status of imports, but rather the decision had intended to allow those assessments
which treated the imports "in a manner that did not depend on the foreign
origins of the goods."28
The Court further cited the License Cases2 1 as supportive of their holding. The Michelin Court found that Low had also misread the views of
Chief Justice Taney expressed there. 0 While the Low opinion had stated
that assessments directly upon imports as imports were prohibited, the
Court in Michelin noted that Chief Justice Taney had further stated:
Undoubtedly a State may impose a tax upon its citizens in proportion to
the amount they are respectively worth; and the importing merchant is
liable to this assessment like any other citizen, and is chargeableaccord21.

25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 436, 6 L.Ed. at 684.

22. Id. at 441, 6 L.Ed. at 686.
23.

__

24. Id. at
25.
26.

U.S. at -,

, 96 S.Ct. at 546, 46 L.Ed.2d at 509.

96 S.Ct. at 546, 46 L.Ed.2d at 510.

25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 438, 6 L.Ed. at 685.
__
U.S. at-,
96 S.Ct. at 546,46 L.Ed.2d at 510 quotingfrom 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)

at 443, 6 L.Ed. at 687. "[T]he tax intercepts the import, as an import, in its way to become
incorporated with the general mass of property, and denies it the privilege of becoming so

incorporated until it shall have contributed to the revenue of the State." (Emphasis supplied.)
27. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 443, 6 L.Ed. at 687.
28.
29.
30.

__
U.S. at , 96 S.Ct. at 547, 46 L.Ed.2d at 510.
46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 12 L.Ed. 256 (1847).
__
U.S. at ,96 S.Ct. at 547, 46 L.Ed.2d at 511.
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ing to the amount of his property, whether it consists of money engaged
in trade, or of imported goods which he proposes to sell, or any other
property of which he is the owner. But a tax of this description stands
upon a very different footing from a tax on the thing imported, while it
remains a part of foreign commerce, and is not introduced into the general
mass of property in the State.31
In arriving at the conclusion, as the Court did, that nondiscriminatory
ad valorem taxes are not within the prohibition of the Constitution, it was
necessary that Low be overruled. The Court in supporting its conclusion
carefully set forth the concerns of the drafters of the Constitution which
led to the inclusion of the Import-Export Clause. In light of these concerns
the Court analyzed the Brown decision and the opinion of Chief Justice
Taney in the License Cases. This analysis provided convincing evidence
that Low was wrongly decided and that the tax in question was not prohibited by Brown.
In overruling Low the Court allows states to assess nondiscriminatory ad
valorem taxes on goods within their boundaries without entering into the
traditional analysis as to their character.2 Thus, the decision of the Court
allows states to obtain revenue to pay for required services without discrimination in favor of importers and imported goods. Such taxation is
"the quid pro quo for benefits actually conferred by the taxing state."33
MICHAEL F. SWICK
31. Id. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 547-548, 46 L.Ed.2d at 512 quoting from 46 U.S. (5 How.) at
576, 12 L.Ed. at 286 (emphasis added). Low relied only on that portion of the opinion which
dealt with a tax upon imports as imports. Id. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 547, 46 L.Ed.2d at 511.
Historically, it is interesting to note that in Brown, Chief Justice Taney had argued for the
license Fee as the State Attorney General. In the License Cases he acknowledged his agreement with the Brown Court. 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 575, 12 L.Ed. at 288.
32. U.S. at __,
96 S.Ct. at 548, 46 L.Ed.2d at 513 (as the concurrence by Justice
White would require).
96 S.Ct. at 542, 46 L.Ed.2d at 505 (police and fire protection).
33. Id. at __,

